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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the various practices and programs available throughout DoD 
to leverage resources and technology with industry. The collaborative methods of dual 
use technology and technology transfer and the contractual instruments that enable these 
methods and programs are discussed and evaluated where sufficient evidence permits. 
The most important programs are the Dual Use Science and Technology (DUS&T), 
Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiatives (COSSI), Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR), Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
(CRADA), and Technology Transfer. Innovation and collaboration between public and 
private industries are explored throughout the thesis with a focus on research and 
development. There is a lack of data needed to assess the effectiveness of these practices 
and programs. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A.       THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD) ENVIRONMENT IN 2001 
The congressionally-approved budget of the United States for Fiscal Year (FY) 
2001 accounted for over $1.8 trillion in budget authority (the authority to obligate funds) 
with an estimated $1,835 trillion in outlays (estimated actual payments expected to be 
made). This budget, like the last two annual budgets, is balanced. In fact, based upon 
favorable economic indicators, surpluses are projected through FY 2005 and beyond.1 
In support of our national security strategy, the Department of Defense (DoD) laid 
out a defense strategy and program which provides the basis for the FY 2001 budget and 
the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The FY 2001 defense budget continues 
implementation of DoD's FY 2000-2005 FYDP, which is the plan for ensuring 
America's security and global leadership. Both the FYDP and the new budget reflect the 
recommendations of the Defense Department's May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) as well as subsequent assessments of strategy, force structure, readiness, 
modernization, infrastructure and other determinants of the U.S. defense posture. In 
supporting the FYDP last year, the President made available to DoD $112 billion in 
additional resources over the FYDP.2 
The FY 2001 national defense now represents slightly more than 16 percent of 
Federal expenditures, down from 24 percent in FY 1989 (the first post-Cold War year). 
More significant, however, is the decrease in defense costs as a percentage of gross 
1




domestic product (GDP), from more than 6 percent in FY 1986 (the highest percentage 
since 1972) to less than 3 percent in FY 2001 and continuing on a downward slope.3 
According to DoD, the FY 2001 budget and the FYDP reflect a compromise 
between immediate military needs (most notably force readiness and quality of life) and 
long-term safeguards (most notably the development and procurement of new weapons 
and technologies). Prioritizing requirements that exceed available defense dollars remains 
a challenge and represents the environment DoD faces while trying to increase its 
technological superiority. 
Achieving technological superiority requires sustained investments in each of the 
three budget activities that fund the science and technology program: basic research, 
applied research, and advanced technology development.4 These budget activities 
represent the board categories of investments in terms of technical maturity and time. 
The basic research program (6.1) exploits and identifies technological 
opportunities and provides an important interface with university and industry research. 
The applied research program (6.2) matures technology opportunities and evaluates 
technical feasibility for increased war-fighting capability. The advanced technology 
development program (6.3) demonstrates technologies to speed the transition of matured 
technology into a demonstration/validation program or directly into engineering and 
manufacturing development.*   These research program dollars are stringent in the DoD 
Fiscal Year 2001, Army Budget, An Analysis, Association of the United States Army. July 2000. 
4
 Army Science and Technology Master Plan, 2001. 
5
 Ibid. 
environment in FY 2001; creative managers are seeking alternate and innovative ways to 
leverage research and development budgets, and reduce program costs. 
The importance of Government and industry working together for mutual national 
benefit is not a new concept. 
Eisenhower, in his farewell address as President on January 17, 1961 
noted the emergence of a permanent armaments industry of vast 
proportions in the United States and acknowledged the imperative need of 
industry and Government to manage it jointly. Today, the military- 
industrial complex - in Eisenhower's enduring phrase - is larger and more 
pervasive than he could have imagined. Linked by profit and patriotism, 
the armed services, corporations, scientists, engineers, consultants and 
members of Congress form a loose confederation that reaches almost 
every corner of U.S. society.6 
In today's business environment, collaboration can increase the probability of 
gaining technologies, sharing the cost of technological research, and reducing the risk of 
being preempted by competitors. 
Collaboration and joint ventures between public and private automotive agencies 
have grown out of pressing needs in the industry, military, and Government to drive 
down vehicle costs, increase technical sophistication, improve fuel efficiency, and 
increase safety. Industry and military collaboration started in the aerospace industry. 
The Automotive Composites Consortium (ACC) was formed in 1988. In 1990, a 
consortium formed between General Motors, Ford, Chrysler and the Commerce 
Department called 'USCAR' formed the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles 
(PNGV) and the U.S. Army formed the National Automotive Center (NAC). Both were 
6
 McCuen, Gary E., "Transforming the Warfare State - Global Militarism and Economic Conversion," 
McCuen Publications, Inc., 1992. 
created to improve the cost and efficiency of vehicles and to develop a new class of 
vehicles without sacrificing key elements such as utility and safety. 
The Army chartered the NAC in 1993 to be the Army's focal point for 
collaborative research and development with industry, academia and other Government 
agencies. Since 1993, the NAC has served as a catalyst linking Government, industry 
and academia. Bolstered by acquisition reform, organizations like the NAC have 
continued to refine the process by which ground military system needs are met through 
strategic partnerships with industry, academia and other Government agencies and by 
investments in state-of-the-art commercial automotive technology. 
DoD should remain aware of trends that may impede its ability to maintain a 
technological edge. Maintaining a technological lead, requires stability in the science and 
technology budget, tracking commercial firms with technological leads in areas important 
to national defense, and awareness of international technological capabilities. DoD 
should continue to investigate new methods to accomplish its research and development 
goals. 
B.        COLLABORATIVE EXECUTION INSTRUMENTS 
1. Dual Use Science and Technology (DUS&T) 
The DUS&T Program was initiated in FY 1997 to increase the use of dual use 
technologies in defense systems as authorized by Public Law 104-201. The program has 
two primary purposes. The first is to jointly develop dual use technologies with industry. 
The second is to embed the concepts being developed under this and earlier dual use 
programs in the Services and to make the development of dual use technologies with 
industry a standard way of doing business throughout the DoD, The second goal laid the 
groundwork for the transition of the program to the services in FY 1999, the first year the 
Services executed individual dual use science and technology program elements.7 The 
DUS&T program is evaluated in further detail in Chapter II of this thesis. 
2.        Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI) 
COSSI is a program jointly shared between the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, 
with the Office of Secretary of Defense providing administrative oversight. COSSFs 
mission is to leverage private sector research and development by inserting leading edge 
commercial technologies into fielded military systems to reduce operations and support 
costs.8 Operational and support costs typically include all the costs of owning, operating, 
maintaining, and supporting a fielded DoD system during peacetime. This includes costs 
for personnel, consumable and repairable materials, organizations, intermediate and depot 
maintenance, facilities, and sustaining investment. Operational and support costs do not 
include the costs of developing, initially purchasing, improving the performance of, or 
disposing of fielded systems. Funding for COSSI was first provided in FY 1997, at 
which time it was part of the Dual Use Applications Program (DUAP) at the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Beginning in FY 1999, the funding for 
COSSI was directly appropriated to the Services.9 The COSSI program is evaluated in 
further detail in Chapter III of this thesis. 
7
 DoD Guidelines for Dual Use Science and Technology Program Fiscal Year 2001, September 1999. 
8
 Army Science and Technology Master Plan, 2001. 
9
 COSSI Website: www.acq.osd.mil/es/dut/cossi/faqs.html. 
5 
3.        Small Business  Innovation  Research  (SBIR)  and  Small Business 
Technology Transfer (STTR) 
The purpose of DoD's SBIR and STTR programs is to harness the innovative 
talents of small U.S. technology companies for U.S. military and economic strength. 
DoD's SBIR program funds early-stage research and development projects at small 
technology   companies   which   serve   a   DoD   need   and   have   the   potential   for 
commercialization in the private sector and/or military markets. The program, funded at 
approximately $560 million in FY 2000, is part of a larger ($1.2 billion) Federal SBIR 
program by ten Federal agencies.'O   The SBIR program allocations for FY 2001 are 
currently being submitted by the various Federal agencies, and are not yet available. 
In 1992, Congress established the STTR pilot program.    STTR is similar in 
structure to SBIR but funds cooperative research and development projects involving a 
small business and a research institution (i.e., university, Federally-funded research and 
development center, or nonprofit research institution). The purpose of STTR is to create 
an effective vehicle for moving ideas from our nation's research institutions to the 
market, where they can benefit both private sector and military customers. DoD's STTR 
program, funded at $31 million in FY 2000, is part of a larger ($62 million) Federal 
STTR program administered by five Federal agencies."  DoD issues one STTR research 
solicitation each year.    The SBIR/STTR programs are evaluated in further detail in 
Chapter IV of this thesis. 
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4. Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs) 
A CRADA is a legal agreement between a Federal laboratory and a non-Federal 
party to conduct specified research or development efforts that are consistent with the 
missions of the Federal laboratory (15 USC 3710a(d)(l)). The Federal Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-502) authorized Federal laboratories to enter in 
CRADAs (15 USC 3710a(a)(l)). Since that time, CRADAs have been a principal 
instrument for collaborative efforts. CRADAs are business, not procurement, contracts 
that allow the Government and industry to cooperate and share intellectual property 
resulting from joint efforts. CRADAs are only one of several mechanisms used for 
technology transfer. They make the technology, facilities, and people of laboratories 
available to commercial partners at an early stage of development; provide a direct 
benefit to the Services' mission from the partners' efforts; and, perhaps most importantly, 
encourage direct communication between scientists and engineers of the two sectors. 
CRADAs are not a procurement, because the Government does not provide 
funding for services or products; therefore, military procurement procedures are not 
required. CRADAs are to be established to develop technology with obvious value, and 
should either commercially improve the U.S. competitive position or service the public 
good, as in health, education, or environmental areas. CRADAs are also sought in 
technology areas of strategic importance to laboratories or centers.12 CRADAs were 
created as mechanisms to transfer technology from the Government to industry (spin- 
offs), and were not designed to efficiently or effectively transfer technology from 
12
 Army Science and Technology Master Plan, 2001. 
7 
industry to the military (spin-on). The details of CRADAs are evaluated in Chapter V of 
this thesis. 
5. Patent Licensing Agreements (PLAs) 
PLAs are another important mechanism for commercializing inventions 
developed in Government laboratories. The PLA allows the transfer of less-than- 
ownership rights in Federal intellectual property to a third party, to permit the third party 
to use the intellectual property. PLAs can be exclusive or nonexclusive, for a specific 
field of use or geographical area.'3 Each laboratory maintains a collection of patents 
covering inventions by its scientists and engineers, and markets those inventions with 
potential commercial application. When licensed and commercialized, the inventions 
benefit consumers with new or improved products. Although PLAs serve an important 
role for mechanizing the opportunity for Government and industry to work together, this 
thesis will not discuss PLAs in further detail. 
6. Technology Transfer 
The Army Domestic Technology Transfer (ADTT) program seeks to create an 
environment that both fosters and facilitates the transfer of technology between military 
and civilian applications. The initial formal requirement for technology transfer from 
Federal laboratories was the Stevenson-Wydler Act of 1980 (15 USC 3701 ct scq.) Its 
intent was to maximize the benefit of taxpayer investment in Federal research and 
development.    The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Lau 99-502) 
13
 PLA Website: www.crrel.usace.army.mil/partnering/Patents.html. 
8 
provided specific requirements, incentives, and authorities for Federal laboratories to 
engage actively in technology transfer. It gave the director of each Federal laboratory the 
authority to enter into CRADAs and to negotiate PLAs for invention made at their 
laboratories. Technology transfer will be discussed in Chapter VI of this thesis. 
C. CONVENTIONAL CONTRACTS 
Conventional  contracts and grants require  adherence to many  Government 
regulations such as the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), or DoD Grant and Agreement Regulations 
(DoDGARs). In many instances, these instruments have proved too restrictive to attract 
industrial firms that are recognized technological leaders in their fields, either because of 
the management, accounting, or other regulations that apply, or the high cost to bid. 
Conventional contracting methods will not be a part of further evaluation in this thesis. 
D. OTHER TRANSACTIONS (OTS) 
OTs are authorized by 10 U.S.C. 2371.   OTs are the most flexible contracting 
instrument because fewer regulations apply to them as compared to other instruments. 
OTs also allow return on investment for DoD. OTs can facilitate the Government's 
ability to take advantage of technological leads held by industry. When industry holds 
the technological lead, it may not be particularly eager to enter into a collaborative 
agreement that would let the Government exploit that lead. OTs are flexible enough to 
allow the Government to design an agreement in which its industry partner sees some 
financial advantages to entering into a collaboration. For example, the industry might be 
very interested in cost sharing. 
The Government can also negotiate other terms that might "compensate" industry 
for Government exploitation of a technological lead. Industry might be persuaded by the 
Government's ability and willingness to negotiate particularly favorable joint-effort 
intellectual property rights. The flexibility of OTs include the waiver of almost all 
regulations that would force a prospective industrial partner to change its way of doing 
business. Exercising this feature can make the OT a powerful instrument for the DoD to 
use to attract industry into research and development partnerships. 
E.   NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND ADVANCEMENT ACT 
The National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (Public Law 
104-113) provides additional incentives, encouraging technology commercialization for 
both industry partners and Federal laboratory inventors. This law seeks to promote 
industry's prompt deployment of inventions created in a CRADA by guaranteeing the 
industry partner sufficient intellectual property rights to the invention and providing 
increased incentives and rewards to laboratory personnel who create the inventions. 
F.        RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS 
Each Army  laboratory  and  research,  development,  and  engineering  center 
(RDEC) has an Office of Research and Technology Applications (ORTA) to actively 
seek technology transfer opportunities and to serve as a point of contact for potential 
users of its technology.   The functions of an ORTA include assessment of laboratory 
technology that might have  commercial applications,  assistance to  state and local 
Governments, and development of programs in conjunction with private sector and 
laboratory technical and legal staffs.   The programs are intended to work through the 
10 
decentralized but coordinated activities of the ORTA at each of the Army's laboratories 
and centers. 
G.       COLLABORATION BENEFIT ASSESSMENT 
Prior to seeking a collaboration business relationship, it is important for program 
managers to understand industry's interest in a given technology. Without this 
information, it would be difficult for the DoD to ascertain whether it could find potential 
partners to perform research and development in the technology area. If a technology has 
many potential Government and commercial uses, then industry's interest is likely to be 
higher than if the technology had potential use for one defense Service only. Industry's 
interest in the former case is likely to be higher, since advantages in the technology have 
potential uses in many products or services. Hence, industry is likely to perceive such a 
technology as more likely to result in higher profits. 
Collaboration offers a number of benefits to the DoD. For example, there are 
many firms that do not perform research and development with or for the DoD, but are 
doing leading-edge research and development in technologies of DoD interest. By 
collaborating with such firms, the DoD can exploit their technological leads and achieve 
technological advances both faster and cheaper. Partnering with industry can also 
introduce new sources of research and development money to the DoD through cost 
sharing. The DoD can also pool resources with industry to accomplish objectives that are 
too expensive to accommodate in its own research and development budget. In addition, 
collaboration can reduce the chance of duplicating work that has already been done by 
industry.   The DoD may also be able to recoup some of its research and development 
11 
costs through recovery of funds, which is allowed under recently introduced instruments 
and programs described in later thesis chapters. 
H.       COLLABORATIVE DECISION MAKING 
Program managers throughout the DoD have traditionally judged the progress and 
success of research and development efforts in terms of three benchmarks: performance, 
schedule, and cost.14    Collaboration assessments can be judged on four different 
benchmarks:   lead, initiate, participate, and monitor.   When an organization chooses to 
lead, it defines the performance goals, provides the vision, and specifies the potential 
products or capabilities, as well as setting schedule requirements and outlining resource 
constraints.   When an organization chooses to initiate an action, it can enter into a 
proactive search for a collaborating partner, and look for areas of intersection among its 
performance goals and those of potential industrial partners. These partners should have 
compatible schedules and have a negotiated set of resources available.    When an 
organization participates, it may negotiate acceptable performance goals if it cannot find 
an appropriate intersection with industrial performance goals, and acceptable schedules 
and resource constraints are negotiable.    The control of performance, schedule, and 
resources becomes a shared effort.   When an organization chooses a monitoring role, 
two-way  communication through  informal  means,   such  as  working  relationships, 
workshops, conferences, and seminars, is most prevalent. 
14
 Wong, Carolyn, "An Analysis of Collaborative Research Opportunities for the Army" Library of 
Congress, Published 1998 by RAND. 
12 
These collaborative management domains can be shown graphically as below. In 
Figure 1.0, industry interest is moderate to high in the right-hand region, suggesting that 
this is the general area where collaboration is likely to be most successful. The initiate, 
participate, and monitor domains lend themselves to collaborative management 
approaches. The identification of industry interest in the research and development of 
new technologies is a strong measurement of the potential success of a given program. 
Collaborative Decision Making Framework 
High 
Lead 
/          Initiate 
Iity 
/     Participate    y/ 
Low //    Monitor 
DoD Unique Generic 
Market Breadth 
Figure 1.0 
(Source:  Wong, Carloyn, "An Analysis of Collaborative Research Opportunities 
for the Army," Library of Congress, Published 1998 by RAND) 
13 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
14 
II       DUAL USE SCIENCE &TECHNOLOGY (DUS&T) 
A.        SHARING TECHNOLOGY WITH AMERICA 
For much of the period since the end of World War II, the scientific and 
technological efforts of the U.S. military establishment have set the pace for the 
American economy. The DoD has been a major financier of research and development 
as well as the largest purchaser and developer of new scientific applications. In the 
absence of explicit Federal technology policy, the practices of the Pentagon became, to a 
very large extent, the de facto U.S. technology policy.15 Past spin-offs from military 
technology include computers, jet airliners, composite materials, communications 
equipment, and scientific instruments. For decades, many companies primarily oriented 
to civilian markets benefited from commercial use of spin-offs of high-powered defense 
research and development. For example, The Raytheon Company adapted radar 
technology to develop the microwave oven, and Boeing drew on its military aircraft 
design work on the B-47 and KC-135 in developing the 707 commercial airliner. 
Today's environment is one in which research and development is being conducted in 
both military and civilian sectors, with opportunity for both spin-off and spin-on. 
In 1994, technical and business leaders in the U.S. chemical industry began a 
study of the factors affecting the competitiveness of the industry in a rapidly changing 
business environment and set out to develop a vision for its future. The work focused on 
15
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needs in research and development capabilities, which are directly linked to growth and 
competitive advantage.16 
The study was also stimulated by a request from the White House Office of 
Science and Technology Policy for industry advice on how the U.S. Government could 
better allocate research and development funding to advance the manufacturing base of 
the U.S. economy. Since then, more than 200 technical and business leaders have 
investigated the challenges confronting the chemical industry today. The results of this 
work emphasize opportunities for advancement in research and development capabilities. 
Participants concluded that the growth and competitive advantage of the industry depend 
upon individual and collaborative efforts of industry, Government, and academia to 
improve the nation's research and development enterprise.17 
B.   THE CURRENT DUS&T PROCESS 
The Dual Use Science & Technology (DUS&T) program was initiated in FY 
1997 to increase the use of dual use technologies in defense systems. The program has 
two primary purposes. The first is to jointly develop dual use technologies with industry. 
The second is to embed the concepts being developed under this and earlier dual use 
programs in the Services and to make the development of dual use technologies with 
industry a standard way of doing business throughout the DoD. The second goal laid the 
16





groundwork for the transition of the program to the Services in FY 1999, the first year the 
Services executed individual dual use science and technology program elements.18 
The elements critical to the success of the DUS&T program are industry cost 
share, which helps ensure the commitment of commercialization, and the use of 
Technology Investment Agreements (TIAs) (i.e., Other Transactions and Cooperative 
Agreements). The use of these instruments attracts commercial firms that might 
otherwise not be interested in doing business with DoD. The increased use of dual use 
technologies is essential to increase performance and sustainability and reduce the life 
cycle costs of defense systems. 
The DUS&T program jointly funds research projects with industry for the 
development of dual use technologies to solve specific technical problems. A dual use 
technology is defined as a technology that has both military utility and sufficient 
commercial potential to support a viable industrial base. By increasing the use of dual 
use technologies in defense systems, the Services can take advantage of the same 
competitive pressures and market-driven efficiencies that lead to accelerated 
development and cost savings in the commercial sector. The key is to identify where the 
Services and industry have mutual interest and can work together to develop technologies 
that meet both defense and commercial needs. The program is accelerating the process 
by encouraging the implementation of dual use technology development projects in the 
Services.19 
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Not only does dual use development make good economic sense for the 
nation, it is a crucial element in the DoD's drive to satisfy its military 
requirements in the face of declining resources. Performance at any cost 
must be replaced by affordable systems, whose costs are reduced by the 
volume production efficiencies allowed by complementary commercial 
applications of military technologies. The DoD must stimulate the 
development of military and commercial technology along parallel paths 
so that technology upgrades driven by dynamic commercial markets will 
be compatible with defense system application.20 
FY 2001 is the fifth year of the DUS&T program. In previous years, 
approximately $190 million of DUS&T funds have been used to initiate over 200 dual 
use projects. The DUS&T funds, combined with Service and industry cost share, have 
resulted in an investment of over $700 million in the development of dual use 
technologies.21 
C.        MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF THE DUS&T PROGRAM 
A dual use technology program is one that will meet a military need and have 
sufficient potential for a commercially viable production base. The term "dual use" 
refers to the character of a technology and/or product that has both military and 
commercial application. DoD's dual use strategy is an attempt by DoD to integrate the 
military technology and industrial base with that of the commercial sector by using more 
commercially available components in its systems or using commercial production lines 
to manufacture unique military components.22 Many DoD procurement programs require 
low yearly production rates which result in decreased protection of the defense industrial 
20
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base.   The DUS&T program can help corporations support and justify the low yearly 
production rates. 
As the benefits of dual use technologies are shared, the cost of gaining these 
technologies must also be shared with DUS&T programs. Non-Federal participants must 
pay fifty percent of the total cost of the DUS&T efforts. 
DUS&T awards to industry are intended to be based on competitive procedures 
and awarded solely on merit. This does not seem to represent a significant variation from 
traditional contract awards. Critics note that some of these programs with explicit 
concern for commercial markets stray too far from DoD's traditional programs which 
tend to focus exclusively on the military application of technology. Projects must result in 
the development of a technology, not the application of a technology. 
During the first five years (1997-2000) of the DUS&T program, approximately 
300 projects have been initiated with over $800 million invested by the DoD and industry 
to develop dual use technologies. The FY 2001 joint solicitation resulted in over 170 
dual use science and technology proposals received for approximately $400 million 
worth of dual use technologies. The focus areas chosen by the services cut across the 
Services' mission areas and technology requirements and deal with electronics, medical, 
environmental and logistics applications.23 
23
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DoD announced the program in the area of DUS&T utilizing a Broad Agency 
Announcement (BAA) conducted jointly with the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The goal 
of DoD is to seek projects to create and/or develop new products or process technologies 
on a 50/50 cost share basis. The program requires that the proposed technology have 
military relevance and potential cost, performance or sustainability benefit, and sufficient 
potential commercial applications to support a viable production base. The BAA offeror 
must bear at least 50 percent of the cost of the effort and at least 50 percent of this cost 
share must be in the form of a high quality asset such as cash, labor or consumable 
materials. The proposer must be a profit company or have at least one profit firm on its 
team. Approximately $60 million of Federal funds will be available in FY 2001 for 
proposals in response to the BAA topic areas.24 
In the spirit of acquisition reform, dialogue between proposers and the 
Government representatives is encouraged. Teaming arrangements, especially with 
academia, are encouraged when the result is a technically stronger proposal. Awards 
from the BAA are planned using a class of nonprocurement instruments called 
Technology Investment Agreements (i.e., Cooperative Agreements and Other 
Transactions). 
D.       DUAL USE PROGRAM DISTINCTIONS 
Dual use programs are those science and technology programs that explicitly 
attempt to leverage the commercial sector's investment in those same technologies.   A 




if it develops the same technology. Dual use technology programs typically involve 
consortia that include commercially oriented firms. The research agenda is negotiated 
with industry and aims to address the common needs of both the commercial and military 
sector. Industry cost-shares the project. The agreements are negotiated outside the 
Federal regulations for grants and contracts. This is particularly important because it 
frees firms from having to provide specified cost-and-accounting data and allows more 
flexibility in negotiating technical data rights. Both of these traditional Government 
policies have discouraged some commercially oriented firms from doing business with 
DoD in the past.25 
E.        DUAL USE TECHNOLOGY TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
In order for DUS&T proposals to be successful, a detailed explanation of the 
technical approach, objectives, staffing and resources related to the development of the 
proposal technology for both military and commercial use should be outlined. A 
technical description of the technology should offer a superior, innovative or unique 
solution to a military problem, challenge or need. The project must result in the 
development of a technology, not the application of a technology, and prototypes of the 
technologies are encouraged. Examples of work not funded under DUS&T include 
market studies, technology roadmaps, strategic plans, and state-of-the-art surveys. The 
technical description should include sufficient detail that provides clear, quantifiable 
25
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technical objectives and a technical approach with a schedule showing definite decision 
points and endpoints. 
The DUS&T proposal statement of work (SOW) should be suitable for inclusion 
or incorporation by reference in the TIA. The SOW should discuss the specific tasks to 
be accomplished with an explanation of the specific approach and goals of the project. In 
addition, personnel performing tasks should be identified whenever possible. A 
discussion that clearly lays out project risks and plans for dealing with them, including a 
statement of time-to-market considering available resources and the existing state-of-the- 
art, should be provided. 
The project teams that include all the resources needed to successfully develop the 
technology and transition it to a defense team as well as to turn it into a commercial 
product or process should be explained. This team should be organized for efficient and 
effective execution of the project, with clear complementary roles for all members and 
clear lines of responsibility and authority in the management of tasks and cost control 26 
F.        DUAL USE BUSINESS ISSUES 
DUS&T proposals should discuss the business issues that the proposer is facing 
and the proposed commercialization development activities. While a formal business 
plan is not required, the most readily accessible form for presenting a discussion of 
pervasive impact and commitment to production may be to provide a business plan. 
Projects should focus on technologies that will have a major impact on the cost, 
performance or sustainability of defense systems. In general, technologies that will have 
26
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the greatest impact on the nation's defense, as well as those that will have a pervasive 
impact across a range of defense systems, will be rated higher. 
The ultimate benefit of the product or process should be addressed. The 
objectives of the DUS&T program are to obtain the economies of scale, accelerated 
product improvements, and increased sustainability inherent in the commercial 
marketplace for defense procurements. It is essential that a commercialization path for 
the proposed technology be identified and that potential commercial applications be 
sufficient to support a production base that would be capable of meeting future defense 
requirements. A technology that would not be economically viable without significant 
military buys should not be considered. 
The team's positioning to reach the intended commercial markets, and the specific 
advantages accruing from this effort should be explained. When lower cost is the basis 
for the competitive advantage of the proposed product or process, sufficient pricing data 
should be presented to permit evaluation of the claim. The market share and 
establishment of high quality job opportunities, and how the commercial value justifies 
the proposed Government investment should be addressed. The commitment to share the 
cost and risk of the proposed effort with the Government and industry should include 
high quality cost share (man-hours, materials, new equipment, restocking consumed 
parts), low quality cost share (wear-and-tear on in-place capital assets, overhead space 
utilization), and unacceptable cost share (sunk costs, bid and proposal costs, parallel 




It is questionable if there are sufficient incentives to encourage innovative 
behavior at the program manager and contracting officer level who must implement the 
policy day-to-day. Much of the motivation behind reform is based on the assumption that 
the military industrial base is significantly segregated from the commercial base. The 
extent to which the base is segregated is unknown, and segregation can occur at three 
different levels: research, administration, and production. Although any savings may be 
- sufficient to justify the dual use efforts being undertaken, it is difficult to know if the 
savings will be realized. There is skepticism that the Government can plan or execute 
programs to accelerate the commercialization of new technologies and products in an 
economically efficient manner.28 
Some of the largest acquisition programs (e.g., tanks, submarines, and nuclear 
warheads) do not have parallel demand in the commercial market. Therefore, 
acquisition and program managers of these types of systems would not become overly 
dedicated to the DUS&T. There are, however, other types of systems (e.g., trucks and 
communications) that do have parallel demand in the commercial sector. In addition, 
there are components of unique military systems that could be dual use in nature. 
Besides saving money by taking greater advantage of commercial production, 
proponents of integration believe DoD could also save money by relying more on the 
commercial sector to develop or co-develop new technologies and products of interest to 
both sectors. Military demands and commercial demands have dominated various 
technologies and products, and the leadership in demands will dominate the market. 
28
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Industry dominance between the military and commercial sectors has changed over the 
years. For example, integrated circuits were initially developed with private capital, and 
military application drove further development and provided a critical early market. In 
the early 1960s, military and space procurement accounted for 90 percent of integrated 
circuits production. However, by the late 1960s, the commercial market began 
expanding much more rapidly. By the end of the 1970s, military procurement accounted 
for less than 10 percent.29 
G.       DUAL USE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESSES 
The following are examples of dual use programs currently being accomplished. 
1.        Windchill 
Product Development Company, PTC, and the Tank-Automotive and Armaments 
Command's (TACOM) National Automotive Center (NAC) have recently entered into a 
multi-million dollar two-year research and development, cost-sharing agreement for 
services and 4,000 licenses for PTC's Windchill software. PTC, acting as the prime 
contractor, will be working with a team comprised of General Dynamics Land Systems. 
Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Laboratories, IITRI/AB Technologies. EDS. and 
Fakespace Systems to fulfill the U.S. Army's goal of fielding its Objective Force by FY 
2008. Under the agreement, the NAC will use PTC's Windchill solutions as its 
Integrated Data Environment (IDE) across TACOM programs to support the Arm\ 's 
29
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Vision of reducing the cost of developing next-generation transport and weapons systems. 
In addition, research and development efforts will focus on providing enhanced, 
immersive environment capabilities, web-centric project management solutions, and the 
development and deployment of a program manager IDE toolkit.30 
2.        21st Century Truck 
The 21st Century Truck program became a national initiative in April 2000 under 
the leadership of the Department of Energy, and represents a partnership effort with DoD, 
the Department of Transportation, the Environmental Protection Agency, and seventeen 
industrial corporations. These groups share a common DUS&T mission whereby 
coordinating research and development efforts and sharing results, significant 
achievements are planned for the trucking industry with regard to energy consumption, 
emissions, safety and performance. 
The 21st Century Truck DUS&T initiative was proposed by the Army at the 
request of the DoD Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security, and in 
response to the Global Climate Change Initiative announced by the White House in 
October 1997. The DUS&T initiative plan was approved by the Assistant Secretary of 
the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition (now called the Assistant Secretary 
of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) in September 1998. The 
initiative   proposed   an   Army   led,   ten-year   Government/Industry   partnership   to 
30
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significantly increase fuel efficiency, decrease emission, reduce total life cycle costs, and 
provide for safer 21st Century trucks for the military and commercial industries. 
The Army received $15 million for the 21st Century Truck Program in FY 2001. 
Under the DUS&T initiative, this allows DoD to leverage not only the matching funds of 
the Army, but the other Government agencies and their matching funds. The initiative 
holds great promise for the Nation's environment and economy by reducing our 
dependence and consumption of petroleum-based fuels, shoring up the declining profit 
margin of our over-the-road transportation fleets and reducing the amount of greenhouse 
gases released into the atmosphere.31 
H.  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS OF THE DUS&T PROGRAM 
"Defense spending contributes to the technology base not only through support of 
research but through procurement - and not only through technological artifacts like the 
integrated circuit, but through the development of engineering tools and design 
methodologies, as well as experience-based learning"32 DoD concentrates dual use 
technologies in the research area, including the learning and design aspects of 
technologies. 
A DUS&T assessment panel sponsored by all three military Services evaluated 
the program's progress in jointly funding the development of dual use technologies with 
industry and making this joint approach the normal way of doing business in the 
31
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Services. At the conclusion of the assessment, the panel found that if it is properly 
implemented, cooperative DUS&T development could play an important role in helping 
the DoD meet its science and technology objectives. The panel concluded that the set 
objective was being met.33 
The processes through which new technical knowledge makes its way into 
fielded military system and/or the civilian marketplace are lengthy and 
complex. In the absence of military secrecy, most of the barriers to 
diffusion from military to civilian sectors stem from the isolation of the 
defense industry. But barriers to the reverse flow, from civilian to 
military, are the more serious problems; they lie in the acquisition 
process.34 
The DoD acquisition process has made many strides in reform during the last 
several years, such as eliminating unique military specifications and standards, cost, price 
data, and contractual requirements. DoD must continue to research efficiencies and 
continue to streamline the processes. 
A principal element of DoD's effort to integrate the military and commercial 
technology and production base is acquisition reform. Acquisition reform seeks to 
remove regulatory barriers and internal DoD practices that inhibit program managers and 
contracting officers from acquiring commercially available products, or from producing 
military unique products on commercial production lines. Efforts to reform acquisition 
rules and regulations to encourage greater use of commercial technology in military 
systems have been around for many years, and remain crucial to attracting Dl'S&T 
partners. 
33
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Reform is proceeding on two fronts, those associated with statutory requirements 
and those that are essentially internal to DoD. Statutory reform is represented by the 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (Public Law 103-355) and again in the 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-106). These Acts have 
expanded the definition of commercial items, relaxed cost and pricing data requirements 
on commercial items, and made more flexible contractual requirements for commercial 
items. Internal reforms have focused mainly on military specifications and standards. A 
major policy directive is that all solicitation should use performance-based requirements 
and requires written justification for use of military specification. Another policy 
directive allows firms to adopt a single management system and uniform manufacturing 
practices for an entire manufacturing facility.35 
The DUS&T program has been able to form mutually beneficial partnerships with 
foreign firms providing DoD access to their advanced technologies. At present, DoD has 
signed agreements with participants from the United Kingdom, Israel, and Canada. 
Thirteen foreign firms participate in the program as members of consortia or as 
subcontractors of U.S. firms. These include firms from Australia, France, Germany, and 
Norway. In 1998, the Republic of Korea established their own dual use program.36 
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III.    COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT SAVINGS 
INITIATIVE (COSSI) 
A.        THE CURRENT COSSI ENVIRONMENT 
The Commercial Operations and Support Savings Initiative (COSSI) is another 
program jointly shared between the Services intended to leverage technologies developed 
in the commercial sector. COSSI's mission is to develop and test a method for reducing 
DoD operations and support cost by routinely inserting commercial items into fielded 
military systems. Many DoD systems will have to be maintained long beyond the useful 
life initially anticipated and planned. The extension of the service life of military systems 
causes the costs of DoD ownership to increase. The insertion of commercial items is 
expected to reduce DoD's operational and support costs by reducing the costs of parts 
and maintenance, reducing the need for specialized equipment, increasing reliability, and 
increasing the efficiency of subsystems. A fielded military system is one that has some 
current operational capability, and a system that is near the end of its useful life is not an 
appropriate target for COSSI. The best COSSI candidate will provide technology 
insertion that could increase component reliability, reduce the cost of spare parts and 
maintenance, and improve the efficiency of test equipment.37 
Funding for COSSI was first provided in FY 1997, at which time it was part of 
the Dual Use Applications Program (DUAP) at the Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (DARPA). Beginning with FY 1999, the funding for COSSI has been directly 
appropriated to the Services.38 
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B. COSSI SNAPSHOT 
COSSI provides "seed money" to insert leading edge commercial technology into 
legacy systems in an attempt to reduce total ownership costs, improve overall system 
readiness, and promote military and commercial integration. The general benefits of 
COSSI include increased mean-time-between-failures, elimination or reduction of parts 
obsolescence, and reduction of spare parts costs, software maintenance costs, testing time 
and effort. The COSSI program uses technology to make more money available for 
modernization, by reducing the need for funds to repair and sustain old equipment.39 
C. FINANCIAL STATUS OF COSSI 
To date, the COSSI program has provided funding for 60 projects with 18 projects 
selected for FY 2001. DoD has provided the COSSI program with $160 million, and 
industry has provided $117 million. There are over 100 participating contractors. The 
average DoD funding provided per COSSI program is $2.8 million. Program advocates 
state that an estimated operational and support cost reduction of $4 billion has been 
realized from COSSI efforts.4** 
The COSSI approach permits DoD to reduce its inventories, obtain rapid delivery 
from commercial suppliers, and upgrade through spares as new technology becomes 
available. COSSI solicits ideas from industry on ways to use commercial technologies. 
Once opportunities are identified, COSSI shares the costs of the nonrecurring engineering 
39
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and qualification needed to adapt and successfully insert those commercially available 
technologies for use in a military system, graphically shown below.41 
How docs it work? 
Commercial ^core** t«:hnology 
Prototype {f^ NRE adapts core technology* for fielded i, ._ svsteni  
Qualification Testing 
Fielded Military System 
/ / / 
Figure 3.0 
(Source: COSSI Website: www.acq.osd.mil/es/dut/cossi) 
COSSI can be described as puzzle pieces of the total fielded system. As 
explained by Jacques Gansler, then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology, "COSSI - and similar efforts in the Army known as 'Modernization 
Through Spares' - help us to focus our attention on the fact that most of our early 21st 
century weapons will be those already fielded. Rather than simply replace subsystems or 
parts with the same historic items where required, we should instead insert modern 
elements (hardware and software) - preferably all commercial - which offer far greater 
reliability at far lower costs - yet with equal or, often, greater performance. Such actions 
will sustain the military usefulness of equipment, reduce support costs and improve 
41
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readiness. For a small investment, the return is impressive. For a $100 million 
investment in COSSI last year alone, the expected savings are more than $3 billion over 
the next ten years."42 
D.        COSSI CONTRACTING 
COSSI seeks proposals submitted by firms or teams that include at least one for- 
profit firm. Proposals must also include the written support of a "military customer" who 
has the authority to modify the system and purchase kits. To reduce the traditional 
administrative burden and oversight of Government contracts, Services using COSSI 
normally intend to use the innovative Other Transitions as the contracting instrument. 
In selecting projects for funding, each Service will assemble a portfolio of 
projects that conform to the requirements of the solicitation and are determined to 
provide the best possible overall value. When two or more proposals are essentially 
equal, preference for award will be given to those proposals which include small 
businesses. COSSI efforts are intended to maintain equivalent system performance. The 
prototype must not degrade the performance of the fielded military system into which it is 
inserted. Any project that degrades the performance of the host system will be rejected. 
The following five selection criteria are used to evaluate proposals. The weighting of the 
criteria is shown in parentheses. A zero on any criterion can eliminate a proposal from 
further consideration.43 
42
 Gansler Jacques S.,   "DoD Acquisition Reform: A Revolution in Business Affairs," Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces, January 23, 1998. 
43
 COSSI Website: www.acq.osd.mil/es/dut.html. 
34 
Operational and support savings (30%) 
Military customer commitment (25%) 
Technical and management approach (15%) 
Commercial leverage (15%) 
Non-Federal share of project costs (15%) 
E.        COSSICONTRACTTING PHASES 
COSSI is a two-phase process.   Phase I is mainly dedicated to non-recurring 
engineering and qualification testing. This first stage usually lasts one to two years. 
Non-recurring engineering includes developing and implementing interface, 
environmental, or performance improvement. Phase I includes any qualification testing 
required to demonstrate that the kit will not degrade system-level performance and will 
produce the expected operational and support savings. The test results should help the 
military customer determine whether or not to proceed to Phase II. The proposer must 
contribute a percentage of the cost of completing Phase I, and there is no minimum cost 
share required. 
If Phase I is successful, the military customer may then purchase reasonable 
production quantities of the kit in Phase II. Proposals must include target prices and 
projected quantities for kits in Phase II. Payment for the kits in Phase II and insertion 
into the fielded system is the responsibility of the military customer; therefore, the 
military customer must identify the source of funds that will be used to buy the kits in 
Phase II. The Services' goal in Phase II will be to purchase kits using sole source 
procurement procedures. In concert with acquisition reform, the proposal should 
35 
represent a fair and reasonable target price, and the proposer should not be required to 
provide detailed cost or pricing data.44 
The involvement of the military customer, often the Service Program Manager, as 
a team member early in the process is critical to the program success. 
Bringing the Weapon System Program Manager into the COSSI program 
early, would have increased the likelihood of successful program initiation 
and continuation through Phase II commitment. It appears that the 
majority industry viewpoint is this: involvement of the program office as 
a COSSI program team member is the best assurance of program stability 
and will lower the risk of a Phase II not occurring.45 
F. COST SAVINGS AND COST SHARING 
Strong COSSI proposals will demonstrate large potential savings in operation and 
support costs within a 12-year analysis period. The repair costs for COSSI items should 
be compared with the costs for inventory items as added justification to warrant program 
initiation, and the measurement of cost savings is an integral part of the COSSI program. 
Cost sharing is a way for DoD to leverage its defense dollar. The flexible cost share of 
the COSSI program is a factor that could help attract competition. 
G. COSSI SUCCESS STORIES 
1.        F-15E Open Systems Demonstration Project 
The F-15E Open Systems Demonstration Project directly supports the application 
of commercial hardware and software technology to upgrade the F-15E Multi-Purpose 
44
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Display Processor (MPDP). The products of the Open Systems Demonstration Project 
are inputs to the DARPA funded COSSI project, "Commercially Based Processing for F- 
15E." The F-15 Program Office rated the upgrade of the F-15E MPDP as a "must do" 
because sustainability was a priority. The upgrade was a high priority because the MPDP 
had high levels of economic obsolescence, low reliability, and severe computer resource 
limitations. 
As part of COSSI, the Boeing Company led an industry team to evolve a 
commercial multipurpose display processor, familiarly known as the Advanced Display 
Core Processor (ADCP). The effort to demonstrate the ADCP's ability to replace the 
MPDP and Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Central Computer while providing 
significant operations and support cost savings is the program goal. The ADCP is 
planned to enable critical operational capabilities and provide for efficient future growth. 
Program plans also include the investigation into the implications of applying an Open 
Systems Approach to the Programmable Communications, Navigation, and 
Instrumentation electronics package. 
The Open Systems Demonstration Project results indicate that the current F-15 
aircraft environment will support the insertion of commercially based hardware 
technology. Products of the Demonstration Project are being incorporated and 
implemented in the COSSI program and leveraged by other on-going F-15 and F-18 
upgrade activities.46 
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2.        Commercially Based Tactical Truck (COMBATT) 
The COMBATT program is the result of an initiative that began in 1998 with an 
effort to develop the next generation of military vehicles with the participation of major 
automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM). It is a joint venture between 
DaimlerChrysler, Ford, AM General, and the NAC to develop a cheaper military truck 
for soldiers and a more advanced commercial truck for consumers. The COMBATT 
program provides a platform for the demonstration of advanced technologies in light and 
medium tactical vehicles, address special mission requirements and provide a possible 
platform for the next generation light tactical vehicles. COMBATT is one example of 
collaborative marketing, with creativity and invention necessary by-products of the recent 
trend toward joint research and development in the automotive world.47 
Many High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) are now 
approaching 20 years of age. The COMBATT program is designed to modify 
commercial pick-up truck missions currently assigned to the aging HMMWV fleet. 
COMBATT is expected to reduce the cost of developing and procuring new lightweight 
tactical trucks. The principle of turn-key fleet management by leasing vehicles for a 3-4 
year period is being researched. Lease costs are minimized because of the relatively high 
residual value of vehicles. Operational and support costs are expected to be lowered with 
47
 U.S. Army Tank-automotive Research and Development Center (TARDEC) "The Army's 
Implementation Plan to Accelerate the Infusion of Commercial Technology into Militär^ Land Warfare 
Systems," March 1998. 
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the use of Contractor Logistics Support (CLS), because stock spare parts, repair manuals, 
or the training of mechanics will not be required.48 
48
 U.S. Army Tank-automotive Research and Development Center, National Automotive Center 
Website: www.tacom.army.mil/tardec/nac. 
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IV     SMALL BUSINESS INNOVATION RESEARCH (SBIR) 
A.       THE SBIR PROGRAM 
Public Law 106-554, Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, which contains 
the SBIR Reauthorization Act of 2000, was signed on 21 December 2000, extending the 
SBIR program until 30 September 2008. Execution of the SBIR program continues to be 
closely scrutinized by DoD and Congress. 
The SBIR program makes capital available for high-risk projects at the earliest 
stages of development, typically before companies can attract venture capital or other 
sources of funding. Ten Federal agencies participate and each year more than $1 billion 
in SBIR contracts and grants are awarded to small firms to develop cutting-edge 
technologies. The DoD SBIR program is the largest in the Federal Government, 
awarding over $500 million annually to approximately 1,000 small high-technology 
companies. High technology has always been viewed with a mixture of excitement and 
caution by investors. Developing tomorrow's planar integrated circuit or supercomputer 
is risky business, but the SBIR program, while not taking the risk out of business, shares 
the cost of the adventure.49 
DoD's SBIR program funds early-stage research and development projects at 
small technology companies, which serve a DoD need and have the potential for 
commercialization in the private sector and/or military markets. As part of its SBIR 
program, the DoD issues a SBIR solicitation twice a year, describing its research and 
development needs  and inviting research and development proposals  from small 
49
 Baron, Jon, "The Federal SBIR Program: Harnessing the Entrepreneurial Talents of Small 
Technology Companies," DoD SBIR Program Manager Report. 
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companies. The small companies are firms organized for profit with 500 or fewer 
employees, including all affiliated firms. Companies apply first for a six-month Phase I 
award of $60,000 to $100,000 to test the scientific, technical, and commercial merit and 
feasibility of a particular concept. If Phase I proves successful, the company may be 
invited to apply for a two-year Phase II award of $500,000 to $750,000 to further develop 
the concept, usually to the prototype stage. Proposals are judged competitively on the 
basis of scientific, technical, and commercial merit. In Phase III, small companies are 
expected to obtain funding from the private sector and/or non-SBIR Government sources 
to develop the concept into a product for sale in private sector and/or military markets. 
Army scientists and engineers develop SBIR solicitation topics that address 
current and anticipated warfighting technology needs. Small businesses enter the SBIR 
process by submitting concepts in the form of Phase I proposals against these topics. 
SBIR is very competitive - about one in ten Phase I and one in three Phase II proposals 
are selected for awards phase HI, the commercialization phase, is the goal of every 
SBIR effort. 
B.        SBIR HISTORY 
The SBIR Program was initiated by Public Law 97-219 in July 1982. It was 
initiated to stimulate technological innovations, to use small business to meet Federal 
research and development needs, to foster and encourage participation by minority and 
disadvantaged persons in technological  innovation and to increase private  sector 
50
 Department of the Army, The Army SBIR/STTR Program, A User's Guide,   undated    Website- 
www.aro.army.mil/arowash/rt. wcosue. 
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commercialization innovations derived from Federal research and development. The 
program was reauthorized by Public Law 102-564 in October 1992. Beginning with the 
FY 94-1 solicitation, the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, 
reviewed SBIR topics to assure that they had dual use as well as commercialization 
potential. 
In its 16 years, the SBIR program has provided over 45,000 awards worth $8.4 
billion in 1998 dollars to thousands of small high-technology companies. As the program 
has matured in the 1990s, Congressional concern has focused on private industry's ability 
to commercialize the results of the joint research. Another Congressional concern is that 
there has been a concentration of awards in certain states and companies. These states 
and companies are often referred to as "frequent winners" of the SBIR program.51 
From FY 1983 through FY 1997, the 25 most frequent winners received over 
$900 million, or about 11 percent of the program's awards. These companies represent 
fewer than one percent of all the companies that have received awards. The programs 
have a high number of first-time participants. One-third of the companies receiving 
awards from FY 1993 through FY 1997 were first-time winners, indicating that the 
program is attracting hundreds of new companies annually.52 
51
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C.       SBIR FUNDING 
SBIR is funded by a set aside levied against all DoD research and development 
funding. In FY 1995, the set aside was two percent, which resulted in a $445 million 
SBIR budget. In FY 1997, the set aside was raised to two and one-half percent, and 
resulted in a $500 million SBIR budget.53 Program managers with research and 
development budgets should plan ahead for this tax-levying process. 
The expenditures of the SBIR program should span the scope of the economy's 
activities, because the missions of the sponsoring agencies vary extensively. The 
difference between SBIR expenditures and private funding is particularly salient for 
small firms. Perhaps one of the most puzzling observations about innovation by small 
technology-based firms is how concentrated it is among a small number of economic 
sectors. For example, venture capital financing has been targeted to a relatively narrow 
set of sectors, such as software development, telecommunications, biotechnology, and 
possibility automotive.54 Many successful SBIR projects are associated with the 
industrial segments that attract the highest level of private financing and the level of 
political interest and constituency backing. 
Program administrators may be incentivized to identify projects with the highest 
performance potential, and there may be political pressures to focus SBIR funding on 
those precise segments. On the other hand, the variety of agency mission may create 
pressures to provide beneficial effect of increasing the availability of funding to those 
53
 DoD SBIR/STTR Website: www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu/sbir. 
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 Gans, Joshua S., and Stem, Scott, "When Does Funding Research by Smaller Firms Bear Fruit?: 
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segments of the economy where small-firm research corporations have technological 
challenges or capital constraints. "Through SBIR and other similar programs, we now 
know that the best ideas don't necessarily come from the labs of large corporations or 
even our Government labs. Most often, innovative technologies are invented by creative 
individuals at small, entrepreneurial companies."55 
D.        SBIR AND INNOVATION 
The DoD goal to procure market-tested products which are reliable, of high 
quality, and affordable can be achieved by working with small firms that quickly 
commercialize their SBIR technologies. Inventors get the benefit of developing their 
ideas, while working with a paying customer early on. SBIR funding does not cause the 
inventor to lose any intellectual property rights for developed new technology. "Small 
companies play an essential role in commercializing innovations. When innovation 
technologies are commercialized, the cost and availability of these technologies for 
military applications are significantly reduced, creating a dual benefit to the economy and 
Defense Department."56 
E.        THE SMALL BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER (STTR) FOCUS 
The STTR program funds innovative technology developed by small business 
partnering with universities, Federally-funded research and development centers, and 
55
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other non-profit research institutions. Congress established STTR in 1994 as a 
companion program to SBIR, and both programs have the same objectives and 
processes.*? The STTR programs provides up to $600,000 in early-stage research and 
development funding directly to small companies working cooperatively with researchers 
at universities and other research organizations. The SBIR program provides up to 
$850,000 in early-stage research and development funding directly to small technology 
companies.*« STTR Phase I efforts can be up to one year in duration, for a maximum of 
$100,000, and Phase II efforts are two-year efforts for up to $500,000.59 
F.        SBIR/STTR "FAST TRACK" 
Since October 1995, the DoD's SBIR and STTR programs have featured a "Fast 
Track" process for projects that attract outside investors who will match Phase II funding, 
in cash, contingent on the project's selection for Phase II award. DoD devised the SBIR 
"Fast Track" policy to make the system more attractive to private investors. Under this 
approach, DoD gives its highest priority in making Phase II awards to small companies 
that attract independent third-party investors, such as venture capital firms, and large 
companies. This policy enables third-party investors to leverage their investment dollars. 
The SBIR program will allocate up to $4 for every $1 of outside investment. At the 
highest rate, a third party investment of $187,500 would bring $750,000 from DoD.60 
57
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Projects that obtain such outside investments and thereby qualify for the Fast 
Track will (subject to qualifications described in the solicitation) receive interim funding 
of $30,000 to $50,000 between Phases I and II and are evaluated for Phase II award under 
a separate, expedited process. Selection for Phase II award will be received provided 
they meet or exceed a threshold of "technically sufficient" and have substantially met 
their Phase I technical goals. Consistent with DoD policy, this process should prevent 
any significant gaps in funding between Phases I and II for Fast Track projects, and result 
in a significantly higher percentage of Fast Track projects obtaining Phase II award than 
non-Fast Track projects. 
Thus far, over 90 percent of projects qualifying for the Fast Track have received 
interim funding and been selected for Phase II award.61 As of July 2000, 158 projects are 
on the Fast Track, and under these projects, $110 million in DoD SBIR funds has directly 
leveraged at least $50 million in matching cash from outside investors.62 Many small 
companies have found the Fast Track policy to be an effective tool for leveraging their 
SBIR (or STTR) funds to obtain additional funds from outside investors. This is because, 
under the Fast Track, a small company can offer an investor the opportunity to obtain a 
match of between $1 and $4 in DoD SBIR (or STTR) funds for every $1 the investor 
contributes. 
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G.       EXAMPLES OF SBIR SUCCESS 
1. Savi Technology 
Savi Technology, Inc. of Mountain View, California recently developed the 
industry's first radio computer tag, the "SaviTag," using a combination of Navy SBIR 
funding and private venture capital. The SaviTag is a radio transceiver with an embedded 
microcomputer that can be attached to military cargo containers, or any other crate or 
container used for transport, and will automatically track the container's location and 
contents. The SaviTag was developed with just $2.5 million in SBIR funding (three 
awards) and has become a central element in DoD's Total Asset Visibility effort. 
SaviTag has assisted the DoD effort to pinpoint the location and content of every plane, 
ship, tank, and cargo container in transit around the world. Savi has received military 
contracts to date totaling over $185 million, and DoD now uses the SaviTag in a large 
segment of its logistical operations, including almost all shipments into Bosnia.63 
The SaviTag solves a very real problem for DoD. During Desert Storm, over half 
of the 40,000 cargo containers shipped to the desert, including $2.7 billion worth of spare 
parts, went unused. The Army has estimated that if an effective way of tracking the 
location and content of the cargo containers, such as the SaviTag, had existed at that time, 
DoD would have saved roughly $2 billion.64 
The SaviTag also has major applications in the private sector particularly in the 






projected to be $20 million this year, and are increasing rapidly, with important 
applications in the commercial trucking, rail, and shipping industries.65 
2.        ThermoAnalytics, Inc. 
ThermoAnalytics, Inc. (TAI) is located in the Houghton County Renaissance 
Zone of the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. This tax free zone has provided an economic 
opportunity to develop and market new products by turning tax dollars into internal 
development projects. By partnering with Michigan Tech University, TAI has 
collaborated on research projects and utilization of graduate student resources. 
Through the SBIR program, TAI has developed a Computer Aided Engineering 
(CAE) software tool using the latest software engineering practices and techniques. 
TAI's cross-platform functionality and object oriented programming allows the program 
to run on any computer with maximum capability of integration with third party tools. 
The products from TAI's SBIR projects have evolved into a core thermal solver 
capability that is being spun off for use in new commercial products being developed at 
TAI as well as several fielded military products used by the services. The funds from 
commercial sales and the derived projects from use of its core thermal solver technology 
have become the prime funding sources for the growth of TAI. Ford Motor Company 




this tool will aid in the fast track acquisition process that the DoD is relying upon to stay 
technologically strong.66 
^    f  ™Sma11 Business Administration, Fifth Annual 2000 Tibbetts Awards, Awardee Profiles October 2000. ' 
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V       THE COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
AGREEMENT (CRADA) PROGRAM 
A.        WHAT IS A CRADA? 
A CRADA is a legal agreement between a Federal laboratory and a non-Federal 
party that allows both parties to conduct specified research or development efforts that 
are consistent with the missions of the Federal laboratory (15 USC 3710a(d)(l)). The 
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-502) permits Government 
operated Federal laboratories to enter into CRADAs with other Federal agencies, units of 
state or local Governments, industrial organizations, large corporations, small businesses, 
public and private foundations, nonprofit organizations (including universities), 
consortiums, foreign organizations, and/or other persons. 
The primary purpose and intention of the Federal Technology Transfer Act is to 
encourage the transfer of commercially useful technologies from Federal laboratories to 
the private sector and to make accessible unique technical capabilities and facilities. 
CRADAs allow Federal laboratories to work collaboratively with industry, with the aim 
of turning the Government's research investment into commercial products. In addition, 
they encourage direct communication between scientists and engineers of the two sectors. 
CRADAs are structured to offer the non-Federal partner an opportunity to 
leverage its resources with those of the Federal laboratory by sharing the costs of research 
for the development of products. The non-Federal partner may provide funds, personnel, 
services, equipment, facilities, intellectual property, or other resources needed to conduct 
a specific research or development effort.   The Federal laboratory may provide similar 
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resources but may not directly provide Federal funds to the non-Federal CRADA 
partner.67 
The Government protects any proprietary information brought to the CRADA 
effort by the non-Federal partner. This provides a true collaborative opportunity. Federal 
scientists can work closely with their non-Federal counterparts, exchanging ideas and 
information while protecting company secrets. All parties can mutually agree to keep 
research results developed during performance of the CRADA confidential and free from 
disclosure through the Freedom of Information Act for up to five years.68 
B.        CRADA CONTRACTING ASPECTS 
CRADAs are not procurement contracts or grants. The Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) and FAR Supplements are not applicable to CRADAs. A CRADA can 
be easy to establish and typically takes between 60 and 90 days to complete.69 Once 
signed, each party pays for its own tasks under a flexible Statement of Work. Intellectual 
property developed under a CRADA belongs to the inventing partner. Often, the 
commercial partner also has the first option to license technologies developed on an 
exclusive basis. 
67
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CRADAs should be established to develop technology with obvious value, and 
should either commercially improve the U.S. competitive position or improve public 
health, education, or environmental welfare. CRADAs should also be sought in 
technology areas of strategic importance to the laboratory or center. While the focus of 
the law is transfer of Federal technology, it is clear that such interactions expose Federal 
scientists and engineers to leading edge technology in the private sector, allowing for the 
"spin-on" of information to the Government as well as "spin-off to the private sector. 
CRADAs have been a principal instrument for collaborative efforts. CRADAs 
are business contracts that allow the Government and industry to cooperate and share 
intellectual property resulting from joint efforts. CRADAs are not procurement contracts, 
because the Government does not provide funding for services or products; therefore, 
military procurement procedures are not required. 
C.        THE CRADA BUSINESS PROPOSAL 
The submission of CRADA proposals take on a common-sense business approach 
and open communication throughout the process is often encouraged. The exchange of 
information may be done by informal and formal discussions and correspondence 
between the potential CRADA partner and the Government. CRADA proposals should 
represent a business plan. 
A typical CRADA proposal may include various sections. An executive summary 
should include a brief synopsis of the total proposal. Market research and analysis should 
explain any market assumptions used in the proposal. The economics of the business, 
e.g., pricing data, retailer discounts, anticipated volumes, expected rate of returns, gross 
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and operating margins over time, and the breakeven analysis should be discussed.  The 
marketing plan portion of the proposal should focus on selling, promotion, placement and 
distribution. The research, design and development plans are usually a crucial proposal 
section.  It should concentrate on the cooperative development, or further development, 
of the appropriate technology that will lead to commercialization of the technology. 
Manufacturing and operations plans should also be explained.    This section should 
discuss the potential equipment and availability, facilities, production flow, quality 
control, order fulfillment, materials, staffing, and turn-around time on orders. Information 
on key employees, their experience and short biographies provide insight into the 
management team. The program schedule is usually an important aspect of any proposal 
and should include enough detail to explain the required timeline for initial production, 
capacity and optional rates.   Critical assumptions and risks in which the management 
team has experience, with focus on critical responsibilities, contributions or actions 
expected to be required, should be explained.  Relevant business and related experience 
can be provided and often contributes to the overall creditability of the proposal.   The 
business financial statement from recent years could present information on expenses and 
expected business revenues of the CRADA commercialization. 
D.        CRADA CONSORTIA 
A consortium can provide the means to solve interdisciplinary problems involving 
broad-based technologies by bringing together the U.S. Federal, industrial and academic 
communities.   The National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) of 1984 permitted the 
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forming of consortia.70 A horizontal consortium is generally industry-wide, oriented 
designed to increase the industry's global competitiveness. A vertical consortium 
involves the collaboration of a private firm, its vendors and a Federal laboratory to 
advance the development of technologies having commercial application. 
Since the enactment of the NCRA, a number of consortia have been formed to 
help facilitate the CRADA process. 
1. American Textile Partnership 
This partnership was established in 1992 with membership of over 2600 textile, 
fibers and fabricated products manufacturers.71 Areas of interest include improved 
materials and processes, apparel automation, analysis, simulation, computer integration, 
environmental quality, waste management, and energy. 
2. Computer Systems Policy Project 
This consortia represents twelve of the largest U.S. computer makers:   Apple, 
AT&T, Compaq, Control Data, Cray Research, Data General, Digital, Hewlett-Packard, 
IBM, Sun Microsystems, Tandem, and Unisys.72 Technological areas of interest include 
gigabit networking, parallel programming tools and processing algorithms, simulation, 
and distributed operating systems and tools. 
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3. National Center for Manufacturing Sciences 
This consortium was established in 1986 as a non-profit organization with the 
objective    of   assisting    the    manufacturing    industry    in    developing    advanced 
environmentally conscious technologies.73 
4. U.S. Advanced Battery Consortium 
This group was established in 1991 and membership includes Daimler-Chrysler, 
General Motors, Ford, industry auto suppliers, and the Electric Power Research 
Institute.™ Its objective is to develop advanced battery technology for zero-emission 
electric vehicles. 
E.        CRADA OUTPUTS 
1. Number of Active CRAD As 
Since 1998, there has been a leveling off of reported CRADA agreements.  This 
leveling follows prior years of sharp increases. A drop in Department of Energy (DoE) 
agreements appears to be one of the reasons for the leveling. Beginning in 1996, DoE's 
Technology Transfer Initiative started phasing out through 1998.   This can account for 
the drop in the number of DoE agreements. DoD has replaced DoE in recent years as the 






 Morella, Constance A., Chairwoman Subcommittee on Technology, Prepared Statement before the 
House Science Committee Technology Subcommittee, "A Review of the Department of Commerce's 
Biennial Report on Federal Technology Transfer," May 23,2000. 
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2.        CRADA Projects Initiated 
According to data from 1998 - 2000, the rate of CRADA formation across the 
agencies has leveled off. Some agencies have suggested that their laboratories may be 
reaching the saturation point in terms of their ability to perform additional work with 
industry partners at existing levels of appropriated funding.76 
F.        CRADA CHALLENGES 
1. Licenses 
Federal agencies and their industry partners often have trouble reaching an 
agreement on the handling of intellectual property. The priority of the industry often 
focuses on creating a competitive advantage while the priority of a Federal agency is 
often the accomplishment of their mission. These differences in priorities and perception 
may result in different attitudes toward the creation and disposition of intellectual 
property. It is often a challenge to determine if an invention should be licensed on an 
exclusive or non-exclusive basis. The agreement between the parties should include 
specific procedures that will be applicable to licenses, the treatment of pre-existing 
inventions that may be brought into a CRADA, and the CRADA legal provision for the 
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2. Clarification of Agreements 
CRADAs have been rejected in some situations, e.g., those appearing to be for the 
purpose of procurement. Although partnerships have reached agreements on a case-by- 
case basis, a more formal recognition of the CRADA flexibility could benefit potential 
participants. The formal recognition could include adopting "model" agreements that 
highlight the range of circumstances in which agreements may be used. 
3.        Domestic Manufacturing Requirements 
Often a "substantial manufacture" requirement of CRADAs requires that products 
ultimately produced by the use of license technology be manufactured domestically. This 
requirement is often difficult for many companies to meet because of the global nature of 
their supply chains and the need to preserve flexibility and promote competitive 
advantages in the sourcing of their goods. The laws do not clearly specify the 
circumstance in which such requirements can be waived.78 
4. State versus Federal Policies 
CRADAs have not proven effective as a mechanism for helping meet the 
technological needs of the state laboratories. State policies and practices applicable to 
CRADAs and to the handling of intellectual property do not mesh well with Federal 






industry more difficult and burdensome. Clarification and streamlining should be held to 
high common standards between the agencies if the goal is to increase or continue the use 
of cooperative agreements. 
5. Importance of Patents and Licenses 
Many signed CRADAs involve research and development that eventually leads to 
the development of new inventions. Innovative inventions often require patent protection 
or granting of Federal licenses to further develop technologies for commercial 
applications.80 Legislative provisions governing Federally funded inventions and license 
agreements have been enacted to provide an environment in which mutual benefit from 
cooperative projects can be achieved. The Federal Technology Transfer Act (FTTA) of 
1986 gave U.S. Federal Government-owned Government-operated (GOGO) laboratories 
the authority to enter into advanced agreements to grant a patent license for any invention 
developed under a CRADA. In 1989, the National Competitiveness Technology Transfer 
Act (NCTTA) was passed. The NCTTA granted U.S. Federal Government-owned 
Contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories the same authority that the FTTA gave GOGO 
laboratories. 
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6. Use of Independent Research and Development Funds 
There has been some confusion as to whether independent research and 
development funds could be use by contractors in funding their portion of a CRADA.81 
In 1991, the U.S. Congress and DoD provided guidance that approved the use of 
independent research and development funds in CRADAs. This approval resulted in an 




VI     TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (15 USC 3701) 
established the transfer of Federal technology as a national priority. It required that each 
Federal laboratory with more than 200 scientists and engineers have an Office of 
Research and Technology Applications to act as an interface with state and local 
Governments and the private sector for technology transfer. The Federal Technology 
Transfer Act of 1986 (Public Law 99-502) amended Stevenson-Wydler to authorize 
Government-operated laboratories to enter into CRADAs with non-Federal parties, thus 
providing a viable mechanism for technology transfer. Congress found that Federal 
laboratories' developments should be made accessible to private industry, state and local 
Governments, and has declared that one of the purposes of the Act is to improve the 
economic, environmental and social well-being of the U.S. by stimulating the utilization 
of Federally-funded technology development by the parties. 
B.        INTEGRATION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
Federal technology transfer mechanisms have taken root throughout several 
Federal research agencies. Technology transfer is greatly influenced by the nature of an 
agency's science and technology mission and by the relevance of that mission to the 
interests of business. For example, the National Institutes of Health and the Agricultural 
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Research Service have technology transfer programs that work closely with the 
pharmaceutical, biotechnological, and agricultural business sectors.82 Their agency 
missions of improving the public health and improving agricultural productivity are often 
achieved through the commercial development and use of their research. In other 
agencies, broader research missions and large laboratory systems produce a different 
approach to technology. The transfer and sharing of these technologies can help 
accomplish various business missions. 
C.   TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TRENDS 
In an attempt to determine if technology transfer has become an integral part of 
the Government and private laboratory culture, the General Accounting Office (GAO) 
has attempted to measure activity outputs. Most of the information collected to date 
measures agency activity levels in the technology transfer field. In accordance with the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GRPA), the collected information is 
essentially input and output data and does not directly address the more final outcomes 
and results of technology transfer attempts.*» The GAO has acknowledged that the 
creation of appropriate outcome measures for technology transfer activities is required. 
Carnes, Kelly H, Assistant Secretary for Technology Policy, U.S. Department of Commerce 
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1. Invention Disclosure Outputs 
The number of inventions disclosed by Federal agencies has not increased 
markedly since 1987. However, the Department of Agriculture and the Department of 
Energy have had some slight increases.84 
2. Patent Applications 
The information concerning patent applications does reflect a significant increase 
in the patenting activities of the agencies following passage of technology transfer 
legislation. Following an early increase, patenting activity appears to have leveled off. 
The DoE and DoD are the most active in patenting, and this likely reflects the tradition of 
"defensive patenting" to protect sensitive techniques.85 
3. Patents Issued and Patent Licenses Granted 
Since 1987, there has been a sharp increase in the number of inventions licensed 
by Federal agencies. Licensing seems to be an essential element of laboratory activity 
which often leads to technology transfer. Data concerning licensing income suggests 
increasingly effective and productive licensing activities at laboratories, with revenues 







4.        Licenses and Recording Mechanisms 
There is some concern with the Government databases that record inventions and 
royalty rights for technology transfer opportunities. A review of more than 2,000 patents 
and 12 large grantees issued in 1997 determined that databases for recording the 
Government's royalty-free licenses were inaccurate, incomplete, and inconsistent and 
that some inventions were not recorded.87 As a result, the Government is not always 
aware of Federally sponsored inventions to which it has royalty-free rights. 
The primary benefits of the royalty-free licenses are that the Government can use 
the underlying research without concern about possible challenges that such use was 
unauthorized. Federal agencies and their contractors and grantees are not complying with 
provisions on the disclosure, reporting, retention, and licensing of Federally sponsored 
inventions under the regulations implementing the Bayh-Dole Act and Executive Order 
12591.88 The Bayh-Dole Act was intended to create a uniform patent policy for 
inventions resulting from Federally sponsored research and development agreements. If 
technology transfer opportunities through patents are to be maximized, there appears to 
be a need for the Government to improve, standardize, and streamline the invention 
reporting process. 
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D.        ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM (ATP) 
1. ATP Background 
The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-418) 
established the ATP to support research that accelerated the development of high-risk 
technologies in public and private laboratories. The goal of the ATP is to bridge the gap 
between public and private research laboratories and the marketplace through innovation. 
ATP provides a mechanism for industry to extend its technological research and transfer 
activities. ATP attempts to provide both commercial and societal benefits. 
ATP is a competitive cost-sharing program that has funded 468 projects at a cost 
of approximately $1.5 billion in Federal matching funds. As of December 1999, 236 
projects have been completed.89 
Through tax credits or direct public funding, the Federal Government supports 
research that has very broad social benefits, such as public health, energy conservation, 
and environmental protection. There is, however, continuing debate over whether the 
private sector has sufficient incentives to undertake research on high-risk, high-payoff 
emerging and enabling technologies without Government support. 
Advocates of the ATP believe that the Government should serve as a catalyst for 
companies that have shared vested interest in national technological development. 
Cooperative companies are encouraged to undertake important new work that would not 
have been possible in the same time period without Federal participation.  Critics of the 
89
 United States General Accounting Office, Resources, Community and Economic Development 
Division, Report Number GAO/RCED-00-114 Advanced Technology Program, April 24,2000. 
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ATP view it as an industrial policy or the means by which Government rather than the 
marketplace picks the technological winners and losers.90 
2. ATP Focus and Cost Sharing 
ATP projects focus on the technology needs of American industry, not those of 
Government. Research priorities for the ATP are set by industry, based on their 
understanding of the marketplace and research opportunities. The ATP has strict cost- 
sharing rules. Joint ventures of two or more companies must pay at least half of the 
project costs. Large Fortune-500 companies participating as a single firm must pay at 
least 60 percent of total project costs. Small and medium-sized companies working on 
single firm ATP projects must pay a minimum of all indirect costs associated with the 
project. ATP does not fund product development. Private industry bears the costs of 
product development, production, marketing, sales and distribution.91 
3.        ATP Award Process 
The ATP awards are made strictly on the basis of rigorous peer-reviewed 
competitions. Selection is based on the innovation, the technical risk, potential benefits 
to the nation and the strength of the commercialization plan of the project. ATP support 
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goals, specific funding allocations, and completion dates established at the outset. 
Projects are monitored and can be terminated for cause before completion.92 
Proposals are evaluated by one of several technology-specific boards that are 
staffed with experts in their respective fields. All proposals are assured a technically 
competent review with overarching, multi-disciplinary technology experts. The ATP 
accepts proposals only in response to specific, published solicitations. 
The ATP process has the inherent need to guard against conflicts of interest and to 
protect proprietary information. Both of these needs make it difficult for ATP to avoid 
funding research that the private sector may already be pursuing. Critics may view this 
as a serious potential for duplication of efforts. 
4. Conflicts and Duplication with Private Sectors 
The GAO recently reviewed the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST) ATP document entitled "Performance of Completed Projects," Status Report 
Number 1, dated March 1999 to determine whether the ATP funded projects similar to 
private sector projects.93 
GAO chose three of the 38 reported completed projects, each representing the 
different technology sectors of biotechnology, electronics, and information. The three 
completed ATP funded projects were approved for funding in 1990 and 1992. The three 
projects reviewed included an on-line handwriting recognition system, a system to 
92 Ibid. 
93
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increase the capacity of existing fiber optic cables for the telecommunications industry, 
and a process for turning collagen into fibers for human prostheses use. GAO found that 
the projects did address similar research goals to those already funded by the private 
sector, thus adding to critics' concerns.94 
E.        TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IMPROVEMENT NEEDED 
1.        Knowledge Management in the Laboratory 
There is an increased emphasis placed on the effective generation and use of 
knowledge as a source of competitive advantage in the private sector laboratories.  The 
Government laboratories need to match their industry colleagues in this regard and 
account for the knowledge resources.   This knowledge base could be used to advance 
agency missions and provide potential new technologies with commercial application to 
the economy.   Prior to communicating their knowledge, Government laboratories will 
have to understand the need for confidential treatment of some developments. 
2. Identification of the Right Laboratory 
It is often challenging to identify the right laboratory to help with specific 
problems. Many Federal agencies have put considerable effort into outreach programs 
designed to make their competencies known to industry. However, it often remains 
difficult for a business unfamiliar with the Federal laboratory system to look across 
agencies to find the laboratories that may have the expertise needed to address unique 
94 Ibid. 
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problems. The Federal Laboratory Consortium attempts to meet this need through the 
Laboratory Locator service and its associated web sites.95 Communication of the 
laboratory skills and programs is not an easy task. All efforts to simplify the process will 
enhance business opportunities. 
3.        Communication with Industry 
Even in today's environment where information technologies are advancing at 
great speed, effective communication continues to be a management challenge. There is 
a need for the technology agencies of the Government and industry representatives to 
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VII     RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.       ACQUISITION REFORM 
Rapid advances in commercial technology combined with declining U.S. defense 
budgets have rendered DoD's traditional, defense-unique approach to technology 
development and procurement less affordable and less effective than in the past. In order 
to maintain our strong U.S. defensive superiority, it is critical that defense programs take 
advantage of cost-conscious, market-driven commercial production and leverage the 
investments in leading-edge process technologies made by private industry. It is also 
important that defense technologies and systems keep pace with the rapid product 
development cycles driven in critical areas by highly dynamic commercial sectors. 
Acquisition reform efforts throughout DoD have made improvements in streamlining the 
acquisition process and making collaboration with industry possible. 
Acquisition reform has laid the foundation to make successful partnerships 
between the DoD and commercial industries possible. These reforms include the 
authorization of flexible contractual instruments, elimination of strict military standards, 
insertion of commercial capabilities, integration of military and commercial development 
and production, and investment in dual use technologies. The monitoring of our national 
security and related technology continues to be a priority issue throughout these reform 
processes. 
B.        COLLABORATION AND RESOURCE BENEFIT 
Collaboration and partnering with industry can introduce new sources of research 
and development money to the DoD through cost sharing.   For example, collaboration 
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can allow the DoD to leverage its scarce and decreasing research and development 
resources to more effectively and efficiently accomplish its objectives. The DoD can 
pool resources with industry to accomplish objectives that are too expensive for one 
source to develop. Collaboration can also reduce the potential duplication of work 
between DoD and industry. Collaboration may result in some auxiliary benefits, e.g., 
DoD could be exposed to ideas and approaches that could have a positive effect on the 
way requirements are identified. Collaboration might also result in new sources of 
supply for needed products and services. 
In order to meet the goals of tomorrow's technologies, and to stretch the shrinking 
DoD research and development dollar, Government and industry must continue their 
efforts to work collaboratively and team together in innovative ways. In doing so, this 
researcher believes that several mutual goals and benefits will be obtained. Government 
and industry can generate and use new knowledge by supporting research and 
development focused on new technologies to develop more cost-efficient and higher 
performing products and processes. 
The need to encourage the elimination of barriers to collaborative pre-competitive 
research by understanding legislation and regulations that allow companies to work 
together during the initial stages of development must be a priority of all Government and 
industry leaders. Taxpayers must encourage elected officials to improve the legislative 
and regulatory climate. Programs that emphasize performance rather than a specific 
method of regulatory compliance with consideration of cost, benefits, and relative risk 
should be the standard method of conducting business. 
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The Government should improve logistics efficiencies by developing new 
methods for managing the supply chain. Efforts to shape information technology and 
standards to meet industry's manufacturing and distribution needs must become a priority 
issue within DoD. Industry should consider their agility in manufacturing by planning 
manufacturing facilities capable of responding quickly to changes in the marketplace 
using state-of-the-art measurement tools and other technologies for design, development, 
scale-up, and optimization of production. Government and industry should work together 
to harmonize standards, where appropriate, by working within the U.S. and 
internationally, and with independent standards groups on nomenclature, documentation, 
product labeling, testing, and packaging requirements. DoD needs to continue to create 
momentum for partnering by encouraging companies, Government, and academe to 
leverage each sector's unique technical, management, and research and development 
capabilities. 
C.        MANUFACTURING AND GLOBAL PARTNERING 
Manufacturers today face greater challenges than ever.     Globalization has 
expanded the availability of new markets, while simultaneously spurring intense 
competition in all manufacturing sectors. New technologies enable us to design, build, 
distribute, and support new and improved products with speed and qualin not to be 
believed just a few years ago. 
At the same time, the proliferation of technology solutions to manufacturing 
business challenges has greatly increased the complexity of making good decisions, and 
the cost of making incorrect decisions. Competitive pressures are passed down the value 
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Ill chain, making it increasingly difficult for small companies to avoid wild fluctuations 
workload and produce at small profit margins with risks that are high. Technology has 
leveled the playing field to the point where a small advantage or a minor innovation can 
mean the difference between success and failure. 
D. SBIR CONCERNS 
The ability to move research into commercialization must be considered as part of 
the SBIR evaluation criteria as well as the actual commercialization. These measures of 
outcome must be reported as a means of program justification. 
E. THE SPEED OF TECHNOLOGY 
The challenge of technology is that it won't stand still, and that the technology 
integration is often difficult to achieve. Off-the-shelf solutions are usually less 
complicated than the real complexity of integration. Manufacturers who buy off-the- 
shelf systems usually find that the cost of integrating the new capabilities into their 
operations dwarfs the cost of the initial acquisition. Many smaller manufacturers buy off- 
the-shelf packages or opt for custom-designed systems tailored to their situation, then 
realize that the system does not have the flexibility to adapt to new requirements. 
Many manufacturing sectors have developed strategic plans to define a path to the 
future for their industry, and identify technology advances that will help them reduce 
costs, increase productivity, improve quality, shorten time-to-market, respond to 
regulatory drivers, and better serve their customers and other stakeholders. Strategic 
management can be a valuable tool to assure that investments are well placed. However, 
many of these roadmaps identify infrastructure issues as major barriers to progress, but 
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there has been little concerted attempt to attack these barriers with the intensity required 
for success. 
F.        RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
One of the most significant connections between military and commercial 
technology development occurs at the level of research and development. It is important 
to determine whether research and development conducted for one sector is relevant to 
the other and how effectively technologies can be developed and utilized by various 
industry sectors. Although many dual use technologies can be identified that are vital to 
both military and commercial activities, other areas of technology do not find equally 
strong support in both sectors. For example, DoD is heavily involved in the aerospace 
and electronic industries, but not very involved in the chemical industry. Barring 
significant changes in its mission, DoD would not be expected to be the focus of progress 
in many areas of technology important to the commercial economy.96 
G.        INDUSTRY DETERRENTS FROM DOD DUAL USE PROGRAMS 
It is not difficult to understand the reluctance of companies to invest in solutions 
that benefit everyone. Resources are scarce enough without spending hard-earned capital 
on activities that do not offer a direct and measurable improvement in the private industry 
bottom line for the next quarter or the next fiscal year. However, the benefits of 
infrastructure collaboration are obvious when one looks at the big picture. Total package 
solutions can be expensive to purchase and maintain, and often lock in proprietary 
96
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strategy for years to come. There is much to be done to achieve total and complete 
collaboration between industries and Government, but the rewards will justify the effort. 
Commercial interest in long-term exploratory research is typically less than DoD 
interest. DoD dual use programs tend to address technologies and technical issues with 
relatively near term application, i.e., within three to five years. The time frame gap 
between DoD and industry must be mutually agreed upon as jointly beneficial. 
Stringent cost and accounting standards and non-ownership of technical data 
rights are two traditional Federal regulation requirements that typically dissuade 
commercial firms from forming partnerships with DoD.97 These requirements must 
continue to be reformed while the protection of national security and data rights are 
protected. 
Philosophical and psychological barriers may still exist as barriers to dual use 
technology. Pre-acquisition reform regulations and conservative mindsets can be barriers 
to dual use partnering. The use of taxpayer's dollars is often under extreme scrutiny, and 
perceived private industry benefit can easily raise public opinion questions. 
Improvement in the competitiveness of U.S. firms can strengthen the nation as a whole, 
thus providing benefit to taxpayers. The psychological barriers that lead to the non- 
acceptance of continued acquisition reform polices need to continually be addressed by 
committed DoD and corporate leadership. 
97
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H.       CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Defense spending contributes to the technology base not only through support for 
research and technological military systems, but also through procurement and the 
development of engineering tools and design methodologies. These combined efforts 
contribute to complete dual use partnering environments. 
Military and commercial technologies are diverging in some cases, but not others. 
Even as military systems push the boundaries of performance, technical knowledge can 
find its way into the civilian market. DoD must be aware of and open to potential civilian 
applications, even those that are not obvious at the on-set of development. 
The traditional processes through which new technical knowledge makes its way 
into fielded military systems and/or the civilian marketplace are often lengthy and 
complex. Acquisition reform has made great strides to allow the flow from military to 
civilian sectors as well as the reverse. Innovation with acquisition reform must continue 
to focus on efficiency and effectiveness in the acquisition processes. 
Several years of budgetary stringency make it imperative that the DoD strive to 
design and develop weapon systems that take advantage of existing technology with 
complete understanding of complex integration issues. 
I. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The following primary and subsidiary research questions were addressed in the 
course of this study. Each question and a brief answer are provided below. 
1. What methods, policies, and programs have been established to create an 
environment in which DoD might form alliances with industry? 
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The Dual Use Science and Technology Program is one means to increase the 
utilization of dual use technologies in defense systems. The Commercial Operations and 
Support Savings Initiative is a program that focuses on leveraging private sector research 
and development by inserting leading edge commercial technologies into fielded military 
systems. The Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology 
Transfer programs attempt to harness the innovative talents of small U.S. technology 
companies for military application. The Army Domestic Technology Transfer program 
seeks to create an environment that transfers technology between military and civilian 
applications. 
2. What contracting means are available to allow Government and industry 
to share and jointly develop information and technologies? 
A Cooperative Research and Development Agreement is a legal agreement 
between Federal and non-Federal laboratories to conduct specified research and 
development efforts. Other Transactions are flexible contracting instruments that allow 
the Government to design an agreement in which its industry partner can achieve 
financial benefits from entering into a collaborative partnership. 
3. How does the Government and industry decide if there is mutual benefit 
in the collaborative environment? 
Performance, schedule and cost benchmarks can be used to determine if mutual 
benefit from a collaborative environment can be achieved. Organizations can further 
assess if their main role in the collaborative partnership should be one of leadership, 
initiator, participant or monitor. 
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J. SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH TOPICS 
One suggested research topic is the outcome measurement of collaborative 
execution within a given period of time. Further research could include the detailed 
infrastructure, management, and outcome of collaborative consortia. The DoD 
prioritization of technology development and transfer with industry would also lead to 
further research opportunities. 
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